The End of Pax Britannica in the Persian Gulf, 1968–1971 by Brandon Friedman

Author:Brandon Friedman
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9783030561826
Publisher: Springer International Publishing

83U.S. Department of State Telegram, London to Washington, 21 June 1969, London 04892 2114072.

© The Author(s) 2020

B. FriedmanThe End of Pax Britannica in the Persian Gulf, 1968-1971https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56182-6_6

6. Iran Shifting Gears

Brandon Friedman1

(1)The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies (MDC), Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel

Keywords

IranBahrainShatt al-ArabIraqSharjahAbu MusaSoviet Union

The U.S. Ambassador to Iran in 1970, Douglas MacArthur, Jr., noted that “with the prospect of vacuum developing after the British withdrawal, it [Iran] is now seeking to allay fears and suspicions of Arab Gulf States by treating their leaders with respect and extending assistance to Saudi Arabia so that some arrangement for cooperation between Iran and the moderate Gulf States can be developed.”1 Indeed, one of the chief differences between the first six months of 1969 and the first six months of 1970 was Iran’s more cautious and measured approach to the Arab Gulf rulers.

In marked contrast to his conciliatory 4 January 1969 public announcement that Iran would not use force to assert Iran’s claim to Bahrain, the Shah seemed intent on presenting a tough and uncompromising posture and policy toward the Arab states in early 1969. Yet following the revolutions in Sudan (May) and Libya (September) in 1969, a much more visible Soviet presence in Egypt and Iraq, and the internal challenges to King Faysal’s regime, Iran’s approach became less aggressive as the ruling shaykhs in the region came under increasing pressure from revolutionary forces across the Middle East. In short, the more Iran felt that the Arab nationalist-Soviet revolutionary forces, as it perceived it, were threatening to make gains in the Gulf, the more flexible the Shah appeared in accommodating the ruling shaykhs.

This dynamic was popularly referred to throughout this period as regional fear of a “power vacuum” in the Gulf. More particularly, what Iran feared was Soviet-supported Arab nationalist revolutionaries attempting to subvert or overthrow the ruling shaykhs in the Gulf during the withdrawal of British military power.

During the first half of 1970, Iran exhibited a more restrained approach toward its Arab Gulf neighbors. This can be attributed to the Shah’s increased confidence in Iran’s future standing in the Gulf, and the improved spirit of cooperation between Iran and Saudi Arabia. It can also be attributed to what the Shah seems to have perceived as the beginning of a more serious challenge to the Gulf from Soviet-backed forces in the region. As a consequence of growing ties between Iraq and the Soviet Bloc and the increased Soviet presence in Egypt, the Shah began to view the Soviet-backed revolutionary threat to the Gulf in a more serious light, and, as a result, adopted a less aggressive posture toward the moderate Gulf rulers.

In March 1969 the fighting between Egypt and Israel in what became known as the War of Attrition began to escalate. In March, between 60 and 80 Soviet pilots and 4,000 Soviet missile crew members arrived in Egypt.2 In April and May 1970, it became public that the Soviets were positioning advanced surface-to-air missile batteries (SAM-3) as

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